It was recently argued that the presence of covert channels should no longer be taken for granted in multilevel secure systems. Until today, multilevel security seems to have been an ideal to approach and not a requirement to meet. The question is: is it possible to design a practical multilevel system offering full security? Based on which architecture? The approach described in this paper reflects some results of a research project which suggests some ideas to answer this question. We have chosen the distributed architecture of a secure LAN as an application framework. In particular we show how controls exerted on dependencies permit to control exhaustively the elementary flows of information. The enforced rules govern both the observation and the handling of data over the whole system. They are achieved by means of some hardware mechanisms that submit the access of hosts to the medium to a secure medium access control protocol. We evaluate how secure dependencies used to ensure confidentiality and integrity in such an architecture do not prevent to build distributed operating services,as file sharing, over a secure network.
Introduction
Many systems were designed in order to protect confidentiality of data and processes. This can be done by building multilevel architectures of machines and networks. These architectures tolerate the existence of covert channels, because standards consider that covert channels are inevitable. It was argued in [15] that the presence of covert channels should no longer be taken for granted in multilevel secure systems. Indeed, applications should not tolerate any compromise of multilevel security, not even through covert channels of low bandwidths. The authors argued also that systems with multilevel processors seem to be either impractical or insecure. They suggest to redirect research and development efforts towards developing multilevel disk drives and multilevel network interface units for use with only single level processors in building multilevel distributed systems.
This position may be debated, but the asked question is interesting. Until today, multilevel security seems to have been an ideal to approach and not a requirement to meet. The question is: is it possible to design a practical multilevel system offering full security? And if yes, on which architecture?
The approach described in this paper reflects some results of a research project 1 which suggests some ideas on how to answer this question. This project aims at building a system architecture (machine and LAN) that offers a high degree of protection for data and processes. This protection is based on an exhaustive control of information flows, including timing flows, and then ensures that there is no place for covert channels. We have chosen the distributed architecture of a secure LAN as an application framework.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews some related works. In Section 3, we show that a system can be made secure by controlling causal dependencies. In Section 4, we describe how this principle can be instantiated inside the lowest layer of the system architecture. This instantiation leads to devise an implementation of a distributed security subsystem that we detail in Section 5. The controls enforced by this distributed security subsystem induce a particular multilevel functioning of the network. Section 6 shows, by using the example of a multilevel distributed file system, how distributed services can be implemented in a multilevel way on the system. Section 7 is conclusion. network server attaches labels to datagrams and provides mandatory access control decisions based on the value of the labels. The Sun MLS OS is an extension of SunOS to provide mandatory access control. It requires source hosts to label packets and destination hosts to check labels on received packets.
All these approaches were developed in order to protect confidentiality in systems. They are based on the use of labels and of cryptographic methods to separate levels. But they do not prevent some illicit information flows. In particular, they are not involved in managing the allocation of resources among levels. And resource allocation or management is the reason for most of the covert channels in systems. In this case, cryptographic methods and labelling of packets are inefficient. Of course, if network lines are vulnerable, encryption can help to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of data transmitted by the network.
But if the system does not carefully manage the allocation of resources among levels, user communicating at low levels could detect and perceive the activity at higher levels. And encrypting messages does nothing to eliminate these covert channels. Achieving an efficient control of information flows, able to separate system domains in a quite secure manner, can eliminate them. Our goal is to devise such a "secure system".
Security by Control of Causal Dependencies
In this section we describe some principles that were used to guide the design of the architecture. More details can be found in [9] .
Observation and Alteration over Causal Dependencies
A system may be described as a set of points (o,t) . A point references an object o at a time or date t. This introduction of time is necessary because time can be observed and altered in the system, for example by watching or modifying durations of operations.
So, one can act on the value of the object o, at the instant t, or one can act on the instant t at which the object o is given a particular value. In the first case, the object o can be used to transmit some information if any semantics can be assigned to its value and a storage channel is involved here; in the second case, time is used and therefore, a timing channel is involved if any semantics can be assigned to the observed instant values.
Some points are input points, others are output points, and the last ones are internal points. These points evolve with time and this evolving is due to the elementary transitions made by the system. An elementary transition can modify a point: then, at instant t, it sets a new value v for the object o of the point. This instant t and the new value v functionally depend on previous points.
This functional dependency on previous points is named causal dependency [2] .
The causal dependency of (o,t) on (o',t') with t'< t is denoted by (o',t') → (o,t).
Informally, by (o,t) "causally depends on" (o',t') we mean that the point (o',t') is used to generate the point (o,t).
More precisely the system can be described by a four-tuple S=<O,T,D,V> where:
• O is the set of objects;
• T is the global clock of the system, and we assume that T = N, the set of natural numbers; • D is the domain of value of the objects;
• V is the set of valuations of the system; it can be viewed as the set of total functions v: O×T → D. Let y = (o,t) ∈ O×T. Let X a subset of O×T. We say that y causally depends on X (and we denote X→y) if:
We say that ∀x∈X, x → y. The transitive closure of the relation "→" (denoted by "→*") at (o,t) defines the causality cone of (o,t), in short:
Conversely, we say that the dependency cone is the set dep(o,t) of points which causally depend on (o,t): dep(o,t)= {(o',t') / (o,t) →* (o',t')};
A relation between the sets cone and dep is given by:
y ∈ dep(x) ⇔ x ∈ cone(y) where x and y denote two points (o,t) and (o',t') of the system. These causal dependencies make up the structure of information flows inside the system. We make the assumption that a subject s can get some knowledge about the internal functioning of the system; then he is able to know how the causal dependencies work.
So by observing any output point x o , he is able to get some knowledge about points in cone(x o ). In particular cone(x o ) may include input points x i which contain some input data of the system. Conversely, by altering an input point x i , s can alter any point in dep(x i ) and in particular an output point x o ∈ dep(x i ).
Let s a subject; s can observe directly a set O s of output points x o in the system: for example through a display screen; we denote by Obs s the set of all the points on which s is able to infer some information by observing directly the output points in O s . In other words, Obs can be viewed as the field of observation of s:
Similarly, if a subject s can alter a set A s of input points x i in the system, we denote by Alt s the set of all points that s is able to alter through A s :
Security
The aimed security must control both observation and alteration over the system. Informally, the system must ensure that causal dependencies enforce secure internal information flows. Obs s contains the points that a subject s in the system is able to observe. The set RO s contains the points that the subject s has the right to observe in accordance with the security policy. So, we say in accordance with [9] that the system is secure if a subject s can observe the only objects he has the right to observe:
Obs s ⊆ RO s (1) When integrity is the addressed property, the same approach can be used. The set Alt s contains the points that a subject s is able to alter and the set RA s contains the points the subject s has the right to alter in accordance with the security policy. So, the system is secure if a subject s can act only on the objects he has the right to act:
Alt s ⊆ RA s (2) When the security policy which is used to define the rights of subjects is the multilevel security policy, a classification level l(x) is assigned to points x and a clearance level l(s) is assigned to subjects s. A convention on levels is chosen: a level l is a pair (l c ,l i ) where l c is a level of confidentiality and l i a level of integrity. The comparison rule on levels may be defined as:
We would like to point out that, according to this convention, we denote (l 1 ≤l 2 ) the fact that (l i1 ≥ l i2 ). Intuitively, from an integrity point of view, this can be interpreted as: an object at level l 1 is "less corrupted than "(and so has a higher level of integrity than) an object at level l 2 .
The sets RO s and RA s may be defined quite naturally by:
Security conditions
It is shown in [9] that two conditions are sufficient to guarantee the security defined by (1) and (2) . A first interface rule expresses conditions on the classification level l(x i ) of an interface (input or output) point x i and the clearance level l(s) of the subject s who can observe or alter this point:
The second condition requires a monotonic increasing (in the sense of the comparison rule) of levels over causal dependencies.
∀x, ∀y, x → y ⇒ l x ≤ l y (4) With regard to confidentiality, both rules (3) and (4) ensure that if any subject s can observe an output point x o then he has the right to observe x o and any point in cone(x o ). So a subject s can acquire only information he has the right to know. With regard to integrity, both rules (3) and (4) ensure that if any subject s can alter an input point x i then he has the right to alter x i and any point in dep(x i ). So a subject s can alter and modify only some information he has the right to alter. In other words, the system is secure (as defined by (1) and (2)).
Condition (4) defines secure dependencies [2] . This condition may seem strong, but it is quite interesting because it gives the semantics of an internal control which can be exerted on each system transition when a relation of causal dependency is involved. It enforces the exhaustive control of information flows.
This control of information flows (including timing flows) is achieved by making secure each transition and each elementary transfer of information. Then, transfers of information in the system are protected from input points, where data are entered, until output points where data can be observed directly by a user. All internal information channels are involved (storage and timing) and it exists no potential covert channel.
Interpretation
These conditions of security ( § 3.3) are instantiated by making an interpretation of the model in the context of one of the lowest layer of the system architecture. This choice permits to control exhaustively each elementary transition in the system.
Security conditions in interface units connecting hosts to a LAN
Network interface units U connecting stations to a communication medium constitute the system architecture as described by Fig. 1 . These units access the medium according to the CSMA/CD Medium Access Control protocol, as defined by IEEE 802.3. We denote by Medium M the protocol data units managed by the Physical Layer. In particular, this layer offers two elementary signals (Carrier Sense, Collision Detection) and V which contains the binary value carried by M. Fig. 1 The system architecture Active entities, which are the subjects inside this hardware layer, are the network interface units U. These units have one input delay value, that is chosen externally as a uniformly distributed random value in a finite range. They can be represented by two data cells: the cell B that contains the binary value b it has to deposit on M or it has sampled from M and D that contains a delay value d to spend before transmitting.
In The receive operation, as expressed in the CSMA/CD protocol, consists in listening permanently to CS and to the value V carried by M. When CS is on, this operation sets B to the value of V. So, the following dependencies are involved:
{CS,V} → B Condition-receive. In this case, rule (4) applied to the receive operation gives:
The send operation is more complex. Firstly, the decision by U to deposit a binary value upon M is taken by listening to M and watching at signals CS and CD. The transmission of the b value may be delayed according to the d value stored in D when CD indicates that a collision occurred. When transmitting the bit b, a new value is assigned to the M's components. So
{CS,CD} ∪ {delay} → {D} {B,D} → {CS,CD,V}
Condition-send. The rule (4) applied to these dependencies gives
It is showed in [7] that if Condition-receive and Condition-send are enforced in interface units by S 3 then the system is secure. When these two conditions are enforced, the level of the medium l(M) fixes the allowed pairs of senders and receivers over the network. By changing this value of level, the concerned pairs can be changed: so, time slicing this value gives a way to allow each station to access the medium. But this slicing must be controlled.
Setting levels
Indeed, levels are themselves objects in the system. So they are submitted to the control on dependencies. A classification level is assigned to them: we have chosen to give the value (Low,High) (that denotes a Low level of confidentiality and a High level of integrity) to the level of a level object. From a confidentiality point of view, this means that the fact that an information is secret is not itself a secret. From an integrity point of view, this means that the value of a level is a high integrity information: the system can rely on it. This fact is not a doctrine, but only a work assumption.
Being submitted to the control on dependencies, rule (4) must be applied to levels and then, given a level l i :
In other words, the value of a level and the instant at which this level gets a given value only depends on (Low,High) information. Changing a level value must have been planned and declared at (Low,High) level. This avoids to introduce covert channels by using levels.
In particular, the value of the level of M, and the instant at which this level takes a given value must be generated from (Low,High) level points. This implies that the value of the level of the medium and the time to be spent on this level are stated at (Low,High) level. So, the use of M is time sliced. The need for time slices at a given level is declared at (Low,High) level and the scheduling of levels is also computed at (Low,High) level by using these declarations. A (High,*) or (*,Low) process (where * stands for any level) never acts on the value of a level (by maintaining it or by changing it).
Similarly, the level of U must be declared at (Low,High) level. And the time spent by U on this level is also declared in advance at (Low,High) level. So at the beginning, U is at (Low,High) level. If a user wants to use the host and U on another level l, this user (and not a process running on the untrusted host) must firstly declare at (Low,High) level that he requires to use unit U at level l during time t, in order to achieve communications at level l. This can be viewed as a strong constraint for the user. In fact, it is no more inconvenient than doing a login procedure. Of course, it is sometimes difficult to estimate exactly the amount of time that he will need. But experiments on the architecture that was developed on these principles show that light overestimations do not degrade performances tragically [17] .
Implementation of a Distributed S 3 over a LAN

Security conditions enforced in a local S 3
Because they are simple, controls expressed in Condition-receive and Condition-send can be enforced in U by a subset of hardware features which are driven by a subset of software. These two subsets constitute the local Security SubSystem or local S 3 of the system. This S 3 , so called by ITSEC [11] in Europe, is in fact the TCB, as formalized in the Orange Book [13] and later the Red Book [14], of the interface unit U and acts as a reference monitor.
The local S 3 is in charge of enforcing the controls defined by the two send and receive conditions and regulating the access of these interface units to the communication medium according to these. This local S 3 keeps values of levels l(U) and l(M) for the interface unit U and for M. It grants or denies to the interface unit the access right to M according to l(U) and l(M). In fact, it can intervene by hardware on elementary operations exerted in order to deposit or sample information on M. So, for the interface unit, the ability to send or receive at any instant t is given by its own level and the level of the medium. An interface unit equipped with its local S 3 constitutes a Trusted Network Interface Unit or TNIU.
The S 3 functioning ensures that values of points observed in U i and time t at which these points take these values depend only on information that are allowed to be observed. Some modulations on values or durations of elementary send and receive operations can be observed in U i : these modulations may be created by a trap inside
M the host in order to generate information flows, but these flows are inefficient and do not strike a blow at the security, thanks to the controls done by local S 3 .
Trusted paths to local S 3
Because the hosts connected to the medium through the TNIU are untrusted, a trusted path between users and the local S 3 of the network interface unit is necessary. A Secure Interface Device (SID) is used as shown by Fig. 3 . A quite simple dialogue between users and local S 3 can be enforced by using this trusted device. This dialogue permits for the user:
• to give user identification and authentication data (as for a login process);
• to declare the value of the current level of the connected host for the next session and the required duration for this session; this fixes the level of the interface unit and the time needed for exchanges at this level; • to initialize the local S 3 functioning in accordance with these declarations. The objective is to obtain from the user himself some knowledge about levels he needs: this information is necessary for scheduling the level of the medium in a right way. Of course, declaring in advance the time needed at a given level seems to be difficult. But in this case, overestimating this time is not really a problem. The goal is to ensure that the value of a level depends only on (Low,High) points. And the assumption is that the user is trusted to give his reservation as a (Low,High) information: he does not use this reservation as a channel to transmit any other information. On this hypothesis, the system offers two more flexible mechanisms. The ability for the user to require the use of the station at a given level for an unspecified time; and the ability for this user to declare that he stops to use the station at this level. A basic assumption is that a user is trusted when using this mechanism: he will not use it to transmit illegally some information over the network. This mechanism for reservations is insufficient. Indeed, the local S 3 must be able to require a level for the medium in accordance with the reservations made by the user, and to know its current level value. A real security subnetwork is needed.
Security Subnetwork
Exchanges between hosts running at various current levels may occur only if the level of the medium can change. This value is time sliced as explained in § 4.2: the scheduling of the level of the medium is based on the requirements of the user. These requirements are produced and emitted by using the SID and the trusted path. Then, two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, the value assigned to the level of the medium must be known by every local S 3 . Secondly, the time slicing of this value must be enforced in a synchronous way over the LAN.
SID
Satisfying the first condition requires a communication subnetwork between all the local S 3 . In fact, in this case, this subnetwork uses the same medium of communication as hosts. The local S 3 which are interconnected by this way constitute the security subnetwork of the system. This security subnetwork is used to exchange security data between local S 3 .
A centralized security station (or CSS) manages the data of security for the network. In particular, it manages levels which are assigned to interface units and to the communication medium according to reservations made by users through the SID mechanism and emitted to the CSS by each local S 3 . The CSS broadcasts also these data to all the local S 3 over the security subnetwork.
Satisfying the second condition requires the existence of a protocol in charge of regulating the exchanges of security data. This protocol is also in charge of ensuring that the time slicing of the medium level is known by all the local S 3 in a synchronous manner. So, the rules which are used to access the medium in order to exchange security data are not the same as the rules used by hosts in order to exchange user data. These rules constitute the Security Medium Access Control (SMAC) protocol.
The SMAC Protocol
SMAC enforces time slicing for the level of the medium according to reservations made to the CSS. It manages also the exchange of security data under the authority of the CSS. These data include particularly reservation data emitted from local S 3 and level settings for the medium which are emitted from the CSS. In few words, the SMAC protocol is reservation based.
SMAC manages two functioning modes for the interface unit: a user mode and a security mode. In security mode, only local S 3 can use the medium M to exchange security data with CSS. In user mode, operations to send and receive user data can be performed by the interface units in accordance with the values of their own level and of the level of M.
The CSS computes time slices for sessions of exchanges in user mode. Each session corresponds to a particular value that was assigned to the level of M. These values are set in accordance with reservations previously received. At the end of a slice, the interface unit always returns to the security mode (Fig. 5) .
TNIU
Fig. 5 Two functioning modes
In security mode, the CSS may ask to local S 3 if reservations are pending. If yes, local S 3 may answer by giving the content of their pending reservations. The protocol for this dialogue is a synchronous one. The CSS fixes a transmission slot for each local S 3 to answer and each local S 3 may answer during its reserved slot. The CSS broadcasts then a new value for the level of the medium and a new session in user mode is started.
In user mode, a Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol arbitrates the access to the medium between units which are allowed to access it: this protocol is CSMA/ CD in our case.
Security mode
This mode of functioning is dedicated to the Security Subnetwork. Only the local S 3 on the network interface units and the CSS are allowed to access the medium that is used to implement the security subnetwork. In the first version of SMAC, the master of exchanges is the CSS; it can perform various security operations. Mainly:
• It can ask to several local S 3 (or to all of them) if pending reservations of levels were requested by the user on the host. This is done by broadcasting a GET_REQUESTS frame to these local S 3 . This frame contains a slot number that is assigned to each local S 3 and that can be used to emit a pending request to the CSS. This request is embedded in a RESERV_LEVEL frame that includes also user identification and authentication data.
• It can accept or reject a reservation request. This is done by sending a ACK_LEVEL or NACK_LEVEL frame to the local S 3 that emitted the request. When receiving the ACK_LEVEL frame, the local S 3 sets the level of the interface unit to the requested value of this level and sets a watchdog to the value of duration assigned by the user to the functioning of the interface at this level.
• It can change the current level of the medium by broadcasting a SET_BUS_LEVEL frame to all the local S 3 . A duration value is embedded in the frame: this value gives the duration that is assigned to the next session of exchanges at the new current level. This value is kept by all the local S 3 : they use it to set a watchdog. When this frame is received, the 
User mode
This mode of functioning is dedicated to the network interface units. They can perform send or receive operations in accordance with settings done by the local S 3 with respect to the values of the levels assigned to the interface and to the medium. The enforced MAC protocol is CSMA/CD. This user mode lasts the time that was fixed by the CSS when sending the SET_BUS_LEVEL frame. The switching of modes can cause an interruption in sending operations. This fact is assimilated to a collision in the CSMA/CD protocol that will retry to send the frame at a next session that will be running at the same current level.
The SMAC protocol is similar to protocols used in the real time world where requirements on the amount of delay between the time a packet is ready and the time it is received at destination are stringent. In these protocols, some sources must reserve transmission slots before they can begin transmission. SMAC was formally described and verified in [6] .
Architecture of the interface unit
This protocol leads to a quite simple architecture for secure interface units. Two components make up them. These are all elementary modules, whose functions are simple and not complex. So the local S 3 is in fact a much lighter component than the CSMA/CD component. It can be connected with an existing standard CSMA/CD component.
About performances
SMAC was submitted to performance evaluation measures. Results of simulation were reported in [17] .Two main lessons were learned from these simulations. Firstly, when the network is used at a single public level, it functions in a standard way and the rules to access the medium are in accordance with the CSMA/CD protocol. Secondly, the network is used in a multilevel functioning mode, two cases may occur.
The first case consists in a good use of the multilevel features: the network is effectively used to exchanges data (files for example) at different levels. This case was modelled in simulation by a strong workload world. In this case, there is a gain of throughput, because SMAC organizes the accesses to the medium. The second case consists in a bad use of the multilevel features: the network is used in a sporadic manner at different levels. This case was modelled by a weak workload world. In this case, there is effectively a transfer time growing. But the results of comparisons with the Token Ring protocol, for example, show that the advantage of CSMA/CD in case of weak loads is not lost with SMAC. So, extending CSMA/CD with SMAC in order to get secure exchanges over a network may produce an increase of performances in the best case, and preserves the benefits of CSMA/CD over other protocols in the worst case.
The CSS
The CSS implements the security functions that are necessary to manage the network in a multilevel mode. In particular, the CSS manages the security subnetwork and performs some services for the Security Administrator of the system. A minimal subset of functions makes up the security kernel of the system that is in charge of:
• storing and managing levels of the hosts over the network; • storing and managing the level of the medium: the CSS performs a scheduling of the value of this level; • managing the security subnetwork by:
adding a new local S 3 ; removing a local S 3 ; stopping and restarting a local S 3 ; stopping and restarting the local subnetwork; authenticating local S 3 and users; • enforcing and managing dialogues with local S 3 by using SMAC;
These functions are implemented in a simple way in our first prototype. The CSS stores and manages a database that contains relevant security data: levels of stations, of users, of the medium, identification of users. The authentication scheme is based on passwords that are stored in the CSS database. When requesting a level, a user enters his identifier (his name) and a password as an input by using the SID; the TNIU includes these data in a RESERV_LEVEL frame and sends this frame to the CSS in security mode.
DS 3 and multilevel LAN
The CSS, the local S 3 and the medium which is accessed in accordance with the rules of the SMAC protocol constitute the Distributed S 3 of the LAN (or DS 3 ). The DS 3 and the local S 3 cooperate in enforcing the control of information flows. In particular, this control is enforced by programming the local S 3 . This programming is done in security mode by exchanging security frames between the trusted CSS and local S 3 . So, these exchanges are isolated from the behaviour of the untrusted interface components.
A multilevel station, M 2 S, built above the same principles [4] is added to ensure a secure sharing of data among levels. Because such a station is able to manage multilevel data structures and processes, it permits to monolevel stations to access data through levels in a quite secure manner. The global architecture of such a system constitutes a secure LAN which has a multilevel functioning mode. Such an architecture satisfies the required security property: all information flows, including timing flows, are controlled exhaustively. It is obvious that this architecture is insufficient when the communication medium is vulnerable: that is not the addressed problem in this paper. Cryptographic techniques may be added to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of messages transmitted over the network. These techniques may rely on cryptographic devices and functions which can be driven by the Distributed S 3 (local S 3 and CSS). They can be viewed as an external protection layer, by opposite to the internal protection layer described here. This system is inherently secure. But does it work? In other words, the system enforces an exhaustive control of information flows to ensure the confidentiality and/or the integrity of data and processes. Then it may disallow some illicit flows. This constraint could be viewed as preventing the system from offering operating services, and as a result, from meeting its objectives. That is not true. This section shows how it is possible, in fact, to devise secure mechanisms to ensure some distributed operating services. We take the example of file sharing [8] . We address only confidentiality properties in this section, in order to simplify and to increase readability. Then, levels are confidentiality levels only.
Basic mechanisms: storage and communications
The M 2 S machine implements a multilevel processing and a multilevel storage of data by using a Security SubSystem (S 3 ). The clearance level of M 2 S denotes the maximum level it can run. Briefly, the functioning of this machine is the following. A current level is assigned to the processor and a classification level is assigned to memory cells. and disk blocks. The value of the current level can change and is scheduled. Each elementary internal transfer of data between processor and memory cells is controlled by the S 3 and must be performed in accordance with no-read-up and no-write-down rules. With this functioning, M 2 S is able to store and manage multilevel file systems [5] on multilevel disks in a quite secure way: it permits to access files and directories in accordance with the rules of Bell and La Padula [3] for confidentiality and of Biba [1] for integrity.
The architecture contains mainly single-level hosts. A level l h , is assigned to host h that implements a single-level processing and storage of data. Each single-level host is connected to the network through a TNIU that enforces accesses to the medium in accordance with the SMAC protocol. The enforcement of this protocol implies that only stations running on the same current level can perform exchanges of data.
Basic data structures
Implementing distributed file server requires three basic data structures: processes, messages and ports. A classification level is assigned to them in accordance with the following rule.
Level_Rule.
On single-level machines, the level of data structures is the level of the host l h . On the multilevel machine M 2 S, system data structures are split among various memory areas at different levels. A particular data structure inherits the level l of the memory area used to store it. A practical management of this data structures is enforced by performing both read and write operations on it. Then, this data structure can be managed only by running the machine at a current level l.
Processes
The involved processes run system code and enforce system functionalities. The level of a process determines the operations this process has the right to perform.
Messages and ports
Communications can be performed between two processes running on the same machine or running on two remote ones. In the latter case, communications are performed by using the network. Messages and ports are the basic data structures for communication (Fig. 8) . A message is a typed collection of data formed by an header and by the sent data. A port is a message queue.
Processes send messages to ports. A port is identified by an unique value: the port identifier. Each port is combined with a receiver process: this receiver gets messages by dequeuing them from the port queue. Processes do not need to know the address of the port: only a port identifier is needed. The sender gives this identifier to the kernel which takes in charge of both finding the port location and enqueuing the message inside the port queue. The network is then transparently used when this port is located on a remote host. A level is assigned to ports in accordance with the Level_Rule. Processes running at level l can send messages only to ports at the same level l and can receive messages only from ports at this same level l because sending or receiving are management operations on port data structures. Therefore communications are performed only between processes running on the same level.
The client-server paradigm
Processes communicate in accordance with the client/server paradigm. Operating system functions are enforced by servers. An operating service is performed by a process or a group of processes running as a server. A port is linked to this server and its identifier is published inside a particular file (yellow pages) where clients can get it. Clients can require a service by sending a request to this port. If the addressed server is a file server, the format of a request can be designed as described in Fig. 9 . parameters FILE NAME CONTENTS file server port and then returns result to the sender process. Therefore, in this kind of communication, the request format is known by the kernel only. When a client sends a request, the kernel includes a port identifier inside the header of the request message: this port is used by the server to send back the result of the service (file content for instance). This port is created automatically by the kernel if it does not yet exist.
Ports are an abstraction of servers and of services. By using ports, clients can query a service whatever the real location of the server. Distributed services can be built by using this abstraction. Several ports may be put together to form a group. Messages can be sent to all members of a group or to a single port among the ports of a group.
File Servers
File servers maintain files, directories and manage them in order they can be accessed from remote processes. There is only one server running on each host. Using file servers is the only way to access a file from a remote site. Therefore files of an host that does not run a server can not be accessed remotely. There are single-level or multilevel servers, in accordance with the type of host that runs them. There is only a single multilevel server in the system described in this paper and it runs on M 2 S. This multilevel file server is composed of processes running at various levels. Each process of this multilevel server is combined with a port that is classified at the same level as the server (Fig. 10) . These ports have all the same identifier: SFS_PORT. This port identifier is reserved in every machine for the file system server. Thus whatever the level of the client, this client uses the same port identifier to reach the file server. Port numbers are multiplexed among levels so that connections to SFS_PORT wake up the process in the file server with the same level as the requester.
When a process needs to use a file service (reading a file for example), it sends a request message to SFS_PORT. This message is put in the port queue at the same level as the level of the sender. Therefore the request reaches the file server process classified at the sender level (Fig. 11) .
Files are stored on disk inside file systems by using tree-structured directories like in the Unix file system. Each host maintains a local file system and a local file server to manage this file system. The server stores local files inside the tree structure
SFS_PORT High Low
High Low but it can also reference remote directories by using mount-points (mount-p). A mount_p looks like a local directory and stores the address of a remote directory. When a mount-p is accessed, a request is built and sent to the file server maintaining the corresponding remote directory. For the local process, this communication is transparent: it looks like accessing a local directory. Mount-p are identical to similar features in the NFS protocol. With single level files and directories, this system has the same behaviour as in NFS. But using files and directories at various levels changes the mount-p semantics. Thus, a process will be able to create a mount-p pointing to a directory d only if this process can observe the existence of this directory d (the process should be able to read the parent directory of d). As in NFS, a mount-p can be created either at booting time or dynamically by processes during their execution. The initial mounting operations can be used to create an identical view of the file system on each host.
Communications can be performed only between processes running at the same level. Therefore when a High process sends a request to the multilevel file server of M 2 S in order to get a Low file, the High process of the multilevel server will receive this request and will use its ability to read Low files to perform the reading for the High remote process and in place of the Low server process (Fig. 12) . The High directory d 6 of the file system that is managed by the High station was mounted on the High directory d 3 that is stored and managed by the multilevel station. Then, a High process on this multilevel station is able to access file f 1 that is stored on FS H . In particular, this process may be a server process. So, in other words, the file f 1 In particular, it is possible to imagine that in fact, the subtree under d 2 on FS HL was mounted by a Low process that is running on a Low single level machine: by this way, this Low machine can publish its local data by allowing them to be accessed by every machine (High and Low) over the network. 
Conclusion
Techniques and mechanisms suggested here were firstly designed and developed in order to protect the confidentiality of data, processes and communications over a LAN. This protection is based on a control of dependencies that enforces an exhaustive control of information flows. It relies upon a distributed security subsystem composed of a particularly restricted subset of hardware mechanisms: they are in charge of ensuring that accesses of interface units to the medium are done in accordance with multilevel rules. This leads to share the medium in a particular way which defines a secure medium access control (or SMAC) protocol. This protocol may be viewed as an extension of an existing MAC protocol, as CSMA/CD. This logical separation, achieved by means of this protocol, may be also used in order to separate integrity levels. In particular, the extremely strong control of information flows which is enforced can isolate some domain where a high level of integrity may be needed drastically. This domain is then protected from other domains of low integrity that can not corrupt its behaviour: in particular they can not enforce any communication channel to send malicious data or pieces of code. Such levels of integrity can be used in critical applications to protect some vital functions.
As a particular case of the application of control of dependencies to integrity, some needs in availability may be answered also. The separation between high integrity and low integrity domains ensure that any (malicious or not) failure in a low integrity domain will not disrupt the good functioning inside a high integrity domain.
This whole security protects efficiently all the information that needs to be protected, and only this information. We feel that this approach is well adapted to the real world, where in fact, very little information and not much functions necessitate to be protected. So, such a system does not penalize the use and processing of most of the data which belong to an unprotected domain. Rather, it makes lighter the amount of protected processing by reserving it to the only data which necessitate it.
A real system is actually under development upon these principles. Some mechanisms and functions of distributed operating systems are being built above this basic architecture. They implement classical distributed operating services, but, taking account of the underlying architecture and of its multilevel functioning, they implement also new multilevel distributed operating services: sharing files between hosts running at different levels, or accessing remote files, running processes on remote hosts.
Then the challenge is no longer building a secure distributed operating system but building some distributed operating services upon a secure architecture, and taking advantage of its security features.
